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THE WAKE OF REGULATORY REFORM 
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel* 
1. Introduction1 
European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) law recently witnessed the creation of a new breed 
of supervisory authorities capable of addressing binding decisions to market 
participants.2 The field of financial regulation offers a most salient illustration. 
Following a global financial crisis which demonstrated a lack of coordinated and 
integrated supervisory tools, post-crisis reform initiatives at EU level enabled the 
introduction of new and upgraded EU supervisory arrangements.3 The EU’s reform 
package resulted in the establishment of three fully-fledged supervisory authorities 
(hereinafter ‘ESAs’), which assemble national supervisors’ representatives. These 
authorities can adopt binding decisions. Unlike their predecessors, who were informal 
committees of national supervisors, these authorities have also fully been integrated in 
the EU institutional framework4 and its constitutional provisions,5 demanding effective 
judicial protection against EU-wide supervisory decisions.6 
                                                          
* Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel is a Ph.D. student at the University of Leuven, Faculty of Law and has 
obtained an LL.M. (Harvard University); LL.M., LL.B. (University of Leuven). 
 
1 This paper results from a project on ‘Market Supervision and the European Constitution’ graciously 
funded by the Research Foundation Flanders. Parts of this paper have been presented at the 8th Cornell 
Inter Graduate Student Conference in Ithaca, NY on April 13-14, 2012. I acknowledge the organisers of 
that conference for inviting me to test particular assumptions in this paper and the participants for their 
constructive suggestions and incisive comments. The editors and anonymous peer reviewers at the EMLR 
significantly improved the flow of my argument in this paper and provided helpful feedback throughout 
the editing process. As always, any errors or inconsistencies remain my own. 
 
2See for an overview Saskia Lavrijssen and Leigh Hancher, ‘Networks on Track: from Regulatory 
Networks to Regulatory “Network Agencies”’, (2008) 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 23-55. 
 
3 For an overview, see Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: 
‘More Europe’ or more Risks?’, (2010) 47 CML Rev 1317 – 1383; Hala Rumeau – Maillot, ‘Les mesures 
prises par l'Union européenne en réponse à la crise: inventaire, présentation et commentaire’, (2010) 
Euredia 495-540. On the causes of the crisis, see Rosa Lastra and Geoffrey Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007-09: 
Nature, Causes, and Reactions’, (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 531-550. 
 
4 Regulatory bodies or agencies have generated a vast amount of scholarship, particularly as to their 
position in the EU institutional system, their functioning and their accountability towards those governed. 
Legal control and judicial protection have also been touched upon, albeit less systematically, see for a 
general overview Herwig Hofmann and Alexander Türk, ‘The Development of Integrated Administration 
in the EU and its Consequences’, (2007) 13 European Law Journal 253-271; Stefan Griller and Andreas 
Orator, ‘Everything under Control? The “way forward” for European agencies in the footsteps of the 
Meroni doctrine’ (2010) 35 EL Rev. 3-35; at the same time however, the efficiency of judicial review has 
been severely questioned by some, see Maartje De Visser, ‘Judicial accountability and new governance’, 
(2010) 37 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 41-60. 
 
5 These constitutional requirements are not only found in the art 19 TFEU and the arts 251-281 TFEU 
determining the competences of the Court of Justice, but also in the Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), adopted by 
the Council of Europe. Art 6(1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a remedy and to access to courts 
as confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights, see among many others cases Posti and Rakho v 
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The upgraded supervisory system therefore opened judicial review avenues for market 
participants and national supervisory authorities against ESA decisions. The ESA 
remedies system aims to ensure that any person affected by the ESAs’ decisions has the 
faculty to refer them for review by an independent judicial body. It allows individuals to 
contest particular ESA decisions before a joint Board of Appeal and subsequently, 
before the Court of Justice.7 Concurrently, it specifically allows national supervisory 
authorities to engage in the judicial review process. 
This article analyses the new judicial review provisions and explores the extent to 
which the new system enables complete judicial protection against ESA decisions, 
affecting the legal position of Union Institutions, Member States, independent national 
authorities and market participants. It argues that the remedies framework presents 
inconsistencies and gaps that render complete legal control of the operations of the 
ESAs difficult to achieve in practice. To the extent that the ESA regulations remain silent 
on these issues, it will be left to the Board of Appeal – a de facto EU administrative court 
– and to the Court of Justice to address any inconsistencies and fill such gaps. The 
following sections identify particular inconsistencies and gaps and suggest alternative 
solutions or interpretations to overcome these identified shortcomings. These 
suggestions attempt to provide a framework of reference for future legislative or 
judicial adaptations to the organisation of judicial review. 
The article is structured as follows (i) Section two places the creation of remedies in the 
overall scheme of EU institutional reform of financial markets. It also revisits the pre-
crisis system’s lack of EU remedies; (ii) Section three introduces the ESA remedies 
system as a particular way to integrate legal control of supervisory decision-making 
within the EU Institutional framework. It focuses on the creation of a joint ESA Board of 
Appeal and the review options granted to this Board and the Court of Justice on ‘appeal’; 
(iii) Section four highlights particular inconsistencies in the new remedies system; (iv) 
Section five focuses on significant gaps in that system. Both sections call for enhanced 
clarification at EU level, either by means of judicial interpretation or by adaptation of 
the supervisory authorities’ establishing regulations; (v) Section six concludes by more 
generally emphasising the constitutional necessity of such interpretation or adaptation. 
2. Enhancing Judicial Protection in Supervisory Decision-making: the EU 
Financial Regulatory Reform Momentum and the Creation of Supervisory 
Authorities  
This section provides a succinct overview of the creation of European supervisory 
authorities in financial law and the role attributed to judicial review therein. A first 
subsection focuses on the pre-crisis system and the roles of informal level three 
network committees as quasi-supervisory authorities. The second subsection briefly 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Finland, App no 27824/95 (ECtHR, 24 September 2002); Cordova v Italy (No. 2), App no 45649/99 
(ECtHR, 30 September 2003); Mendel v Sweden, App no 28426/06 (ECtHR, 7 April 2009). 
 
6 For an overview of effective judicial protection in a shared and integrated legal order, see Jan Jans, Roel 
de lange, Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, Europeanization of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing 
2007) 241-317. 
 
7 References to the Court of Justice or the Court in this contribution indicate the general Union Institution, 
comprising the European Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Particular 
references to either the European Court of Justice or the General Court will be indicated as such. 
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describes the post-crisis establishment of EU supervisory authorities. The creation of 
these authorities is part of a broader institutional reform movement.8 
2.1. Before the Crisis: Hybrid Network Committees as Quasi-supervisors 
Despite intense ‘Europeanisation’ of financial regulation, an integrated EU system of 
financial market supervision was absent at the outset of the 2008 crisis.9 The 1999 
Financial Services Action Plan had revitalised the completion of the Internal Market in 
financial services and resulted in extensive EU financial regulatory activity.10 The 
Institutional changes required to smoothen this process, evidenced in the Final Report 
of the Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, did not however 
envisage the creation of EU supervisory authorities.11 
The ‘Lamfalussy’ Report initially aimed to facilitate the adoption and implementation of 
EU securities regulation. It proposed a four-level approach to EU regulatory action. 
Level one action aimed to adopt general principles in EU Regulations and Directives.12 
Level two intended to implement these principles at EU level through technical and 
detailed level two Directives or Regulations.13 Level three contained convergence 
mechanisms for coordinated implementation of levels one and two measures. Contrary 
                                                          
8 The other components part of this reform have been extensively been discussed elsewhere and will 
therefore not be analysed in this paper. See for an overview, Jean Victor Louis, ‘The Implementation of the 
Larosière Report: A Progress Report’ in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (ed.), International Monetary 
and Financial Law. The Global Crisis (OUP, 2010) 146-176; Takis Tridimas, ‘EU Financial Regulation: 
Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform’ in Paul Craig and Grainné De Búrca, The Evolution of 
EU Law (OUP, 2011) 783-804. See also Niamh Moloney (n 3). On the interaction between institutional and 
substantive reform, see Blanche Sousi, ‘La réglementation bancaire de l'Union européenne après la crise: 
un monde sans conscience et sans confiance?’ (2011) Euredia 121-132. Reform measures introduced a 
European Systemic Risk Board, see Eillis Ferran and Kern Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? 
The special case of the European Systemic Risk Board’ (2010) 6 EL Rev 751-776. For a general critique, 
see Christian Noyer, ‘Les défis de la nouvelle architecture de la supervision européenne’ (2010) Euredia 
151-155. 
 
9 That was even the case where the Treaty explicitly provided for financial supervision. According to art 
127 (6) TFEU, the European Central Bank can be conferred a role in prudential supervision of individual 
financial institutions. As such, a legal basis for integrated market supervision in the hands of the ECB did 
exist. Art 127 (5) TFEU authorises the European System of Central Banks to contribute to the smooth 
conduct of prudential supervision policies. 
 
10 COM (1999) 232, 11 May 1999, ‘Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial 
Markets: An Action Plan’ 32 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf> accessed April 
2012. 
 
11 ‘Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the regulation of European Securities Markets’, 15 
February 2001 117 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-
report-wise-men_en.pdf> (hereafter referred to as Lamfalussy report) accessed April 2012. See among 
many others Jan Andersson, ‘The Regulatory Technique of EU Securities Law – A Few Remarks’ (2002) 13 
European Business Law Review 313 – 322. 
 
12 Lamfalussy Report, 22-23. 
 
13 Lamfalussy Report, 28. On the differences between Levels 1 and 2, see Yannis Avgerinos, ‘Essential and 
Non-essential Measures: Delegation of Powers in EU Securities Regulation’, (2002) 8 European Law 
Journal 269-289. Level 2 measures extensively relied on Committee deliberations (so-called Comitology 
procedures). 
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to level one and two, level three operated in the shadows of EU legislative procedures 
and EU law. A network of national supervisory authorities—the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (hereinafter ‘CESR’)14—would issue non-binding guidelines and 
recommendations on the transposition and interpretation of level one and two 
Directives or Regulations.15 Furthermore, the CESR was also invited to adopt guidelines 
to ensure regulatory convergence in fields not explicitly covered by the Level one and 
two measures and to design a common set of supervisory guidelines.16 Level four 
focused on enhanced enforcement by the European Commission through the 
infringement procedure in the EC Treaty (now Article 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter ‘TFEU’).17 
The Council and European Parliament endorsed this regulatory approach and 
subsequently extended it to banking and insurance regulation.18 The extension also 
resulted in the creation of a Committee of European Banking Regulators (hereinafter 
‘CEBS’) and a Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors 
(hereinafter ‘CEIOPS’) in addition to CESR at level three.19 
Level three committees comprised an institutional peculiarity in the overall EU 
regulatory framework. Created by a Commission Decision, the Committees lacked 
independent EU legal personality.20 This structure inspired some scholars to conclude 
that the Committees did not enjoy any legal personality at all.21All committees had 
however been incorporated under the national corporate laws of Member States and 
thus operated as legal persons in terms of national law. CESR for example, was 
officially22 a legal person under the 1901 Statute on the contract of association.23 
                                                          
14 Commission Decision 2001/527/EC, [2001] O.J. L 191/43, replaced by Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC, [2009] O.J.L 25/18 (hereinafter ‘2009 CESR Decision’). 
 
15 On CESR, see Eddy Wymeersch, ‘“Het “Committee of European Securities Regulators” of “CESR”’ (2007) 
Forum Financier/DroitBancaire et Financier 211-224. 
 
16 Lamfalussy Report, 37-38. 
 
17 Lamfalussy Report, 40. 
 
18 See on these evolutions among others, Bénédicte Vaccari, ‘Le processus Lamfalussy : enjeux, leçons et 
perspectives’ (2007) Revue du droit de l’Union Européenne 41-72. 
 
19 For CEBS, see Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, [2004] O.J.L 3/28, replaced by Commission Decision 
2009/78/EC, [2009] O.J. L 25/23. For CEIOPS, Commission Decision 2004/6/EC, [2004] O.J. L 3/30, 
replaced by Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, [2009] O.J. L 25/28. 
 
20 According to art 288 TFEU, a decision is binding in its entirety and is addressed to particular 
individuals. In this case however, a decision is used to adopt a particular binding act in case no particular 
instrument has been prescribed, see Koen Lenaerts, Piet Van Nuffel and Robert Bray (ed.), Constitutional 
Law of the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 784. 
 
21 Saskia Lavrijssen and Leigh Hancher, ‘De rol van de netwerken van nationale 
mededingingstoezichthouders bij de bevordering van good governance in de Europese Unie’ in Philip 
Eijlander and Rob Van Gestel (ed.), Domeinconflicten tussen nationaal en Europees toezicht (Boom 2006), 
98; Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, Does the EU need a single European securities regulator?’ in Herwig 
Hofmann and Alexander Türk, EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006) 254. 
 
22 Although this fact had hardly been publicised on the CESR website, its chairman nevertheless explicitly 
stated so in a scholarly article, see Eddy Wymeersch (n 15). 
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According to that Statute, an association comprises members that bring together their 
knowledge or activities into a single legal structure.24 That structure is recognised as a 
legal person under French law.25 Both CEBS and CEIOPS relied on similar statutes in 
German and English law to gain legal personality.26 
Before the crisis, the level three system was perceived as a model for new bottom-up 
law making methods in the EU. The adoption of guidelines and recommendations at 
level three would gradually bring convergence among Member States’ legal frameworks 
and would thus contribute to a common European financial regulatory framework.27 In 
so acting, level three committees would function as unofficial supranational supervisory 
authorities.28 The informal coordination roles of level three network committees also 
justified their limited legal status at EU level. Their national law incorporation limited 
the committees’ capacities to act on an EU-wide basis. To some extent, the private laws 
of Member States were called upon to incorporate and group foreign public supervisory 
authorities with a view to create and develop coordinated implementation guidelines. In 
different Member States, Committees’ decisions were not binding as a matter of EU law. 
One could only rely on particular legal provisions related to the law of associations and 
their application to transnational situations to allow some binding force for level three 
association decisions.29 
Due to the heterodox status of the level three Committees, the authority of their 
guidelines and recommendations remained unclear as a matter of EU and national law. 
A consensus seemed to have emerged that level three guidelines constituted merely soft 
law from an EU law perspective and could therefore only be addressed to the members 
of the association, that is, the national supervisory authorities, without recourse to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
23 Loi du 1er Juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association <www.legifrance.gouv.fr> (hereinafter ‘Loi 
1901’). 
 
24 Art 1 Loi 1901: L'association est la convention par laquelle deux ou plusieurs personnes mettent en 
commun, d'une façon permanente, leurs connaissances ou leur activité dans un but autre que de partager 
des bénéfices. Elle est régie, quant à sa validité, par les principes généraux du droit applicables aux 
contrats et obligations.  
 
25 Art 5, Loi 1901; In order to obtain legal personality, a preliminary declaration is to be submitted, 
encompassing le titre et l'objet de l'association, le siège de ses établissements et les noms, professions et 
domiciles et nationalités de ceux qui, à un titre quelconque, sont chargés de son administration. Un 
exemplaire des statutsest joint à la déclaration.  
 
26 The Commission itself referred to this legal personality in terms of national law in its ‘Proposal for a 
Decision of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a Community program to support 




27 See Walter van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in 
Fabbrizio Caffagi (ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP 2006) 57- 60. 
 
28 Niamh Moloney, ‘Law-making Risks in EC Financial Market Regulation after the Financial services 
Action Plan’ in S. Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation (Hart 2007) 352. 
29 See P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Individuele rechtsbescherming, Europese netwerken van nationale 
toezichthouders en “Lamfalussy”-convergentie’, (2010) SEW – Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch 
Recht  13-31. 
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classical EU law judicial protection and enforcement mechanisms. National authorities 
could not be forced by EU Institutions to comply with guidelines and recommendations. 
They only had to present the reasons for their refusal to do so.30 The enforcement of 
level three guidelines thus relied on the willingness of national supervisors to ensure 
their application. Guidelines or recommendations were not part of EU law and could not 
be captured by the EU judicial review system. Nonetheless, it was also recognised that 
level three measures constituted much more than mere soft law guidelines.31 They 
added an additional regulatory layer. 
2.2. Post-crisis Responses: New Supervisory Authorities at the EU Level 
The global financial crisis proved to be a major catalyst for institutional reform at EU 
level. The development of a supervisory system that operated under a more stringent 
rule of law proved essential in that regard. The first EU assessment of the crisis in the 
De Larosière Report focused on the Institutional arrangements and more particularly, 
the role of EU Institutions in supporting, providing, or ensuring supervision.32 
According to the Report, the financial crisis demonstrated the lack of equilibrium in the 
level three approach as it did not suffice to avert crisis dangers.33In order to address the 
financial crisis at EU level, the supervisory system was to be strengthened and 
integrated into the EU constitutional system. The creation of new supervisory 
authorities would be required in that regard.34    
In response to these proposals, the Commission supported the creation of EU 
supervisory agencies and succeeded in convincing the Council and European Parliament 
to adopt legislative proposals.35 The regulatory update logically resulted in the creation 
of three ESAs: the European Banking Authority (hereinafter the ‘EBA’), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (hereinafter ‘EIOPA’), and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter ‘ESMA’). The regulations 
establishing these authorities, the ESA Regulations,36 frequently refer to concepts such 
                                                          
30 This is apparent from art 14 2009 CESR decision (n 14). 
 
31 T. Tridimas (n8) 787.    
 
32 The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report, 25 February 2009 85 (hereinafter ‘De 
Larosière Report’) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf> 
accessed April 2012. See also C. Gortsos, ‘The proposals of the Larosière Group on the Future of Financial 
Supervision in the European Union’ in M. Giovanoli and D. Devos (ed.) (n8) 128-145. 
 
33 Ibid., 41.  
 
34 Ibid., 52. 
 
35 On these proposals in particular, see Asen Lefterov, ‘How feasible is the proposal for establishing a new 
European system of financial supervisors?’ (2011) 38  Legal Issues of Economic Integration 33-64; Anders 
Neergaard, ‘European Supervisory Authorities. A New Model for the Exercise of Powers in the European 
Union?’ (2009) Euredia 603-630; E. Wymeersch, ‘The Institutional Reforms of the European Financial 
Supervisory System, an Interim Report’ 19  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1541968> accessed April 2012. 
 
36 Regulation 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) amending Decision 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, [2010] O.J. L 331/12 (hereafter referred 
to as EBA Regulation); Regulation 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
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as rights, remedies, legal personality among others.37 The introduction of elaborate legal 
guarantees aimed to overcome the structural limits reflected by level three network 
committees. 
These three authorities38 constitute improved successors to CEBS, CEIOPS, and CESR 
from a number of perspectives.39  
Firstly, these authorities have been explicitly granted legal personality in terms of EU 
law.40 The complicated structures of legal persons at national law contributed to EU 
convergence and ensuing uncertainties regarding the legal status of ESAs’ decisions 
have thus been abandoned.  
Secondly, their internal functioning and decision-making structure has been 
streamlined: all authorities consist of a Board comprising representatives of all national 
supervisors, a Management Board, a full-time Chairperson, and an Executive Director.41 
Most decisions are adopted by the Board of Supervisors by means of qualified majority 
voting similar to the procedures in the Council.42  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority) amending Decision 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, 
[2010] O.J. L 331/ 48 (hereafter referred to as EIOPA Regulation); Regulation 1095/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority) amending Decision 716/2009/EC and repealing 
Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, [2010] O.J. L 331/84 (hereafter called ESMA Regulation). All 
Regulations follow the same structure and numbering of Articles. I will refer to all Regulations collectively 
as the ESA Regulations. The new authorities are crucial for the establishment of a European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS, arts 2 ESA Regulations). See Eillis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New 
Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law 
Research Paper 29/2011, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701147> 
accessed April 2012. 
 
37 Remarkably, the establishment of the internal market is no longer the expressed focus of these 
regulations; see Elaine Fahey, ‘Does the Emperor have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the Legal 
Basis of the European Banking Authority’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 586. 
 
38 Even though the regulations refer to them as ‘authorities’, they function and operate as regulatory 
agencies, see Niamh Moloney (n 3) 1341.  
 
39 Their seat remains where the level three Committees used to be stationed; see ESA Regulations, art 7. 
See among others Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: the 
beginnings of a powerful European Securities Authority?’ (2011) Law and Financial Markets Review 21-
32; Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU 
Financial Market –A Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-Making’ (2011) 12 European Business 
Organization Law Review 41-86; Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority an 
Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in Action’ 
(2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 177-225. 
 
40 ESA Regulations, art 5. 
 
41 ESA Regulations, arts 6 and 40-53. 
 
42 ESA Regulations, art 44(1). In particular instances of settlement of supervisory disputes, the Board of 
Supervisors shall decide by means of simple majority; the proposal can however be blocked by a qualified 
majority. 
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Thirdly, accountability mechanisms, consultation, and transparency obligations43 have 
significantly improved by incorporating those obligations within the general EU legal 
and budgetary framework.44 The authorities are themselves non-contractually liable 
towards third parties.45 Permanently institutionalised stakeholder groups allow the 
ESAs to interact with selected market participants.46  
Fourthly, the authorities officially cooperate more closely with national supervisory 
authorities and foster the establishment of colleges of supervisors for cross-border 
financial institutions.47 The ESAs also regularly convene in a joint committee.48  
Fifthly, the authorities can adopt binding individual decisions addressed to national 
supervisory authorities and/or individual financial institutions in cases of breach of 
substantive EU financial law,49 in ‘emergency situations’50  and towards the settlement 
of disagreements between competent national authorities in cross-border situations.51 
The ESAs can also issue prohibitions or restrictions on practices that affect consumer 
protection.52  
An ESA body cannot adopt a binding individual decision without first reminding a 
national authority of its obligations, addressing guidelines or recommendations, and 
allowing the Commission to address non-binding advice to the Member State 
concerned. In addition, the ESA body can only adopt a decision addressed to individual 
market participants or financial institutions where the relevant requirements of the 
                                                          
43 ESA Regulations, art 29-35. 
 
44 ESA Regulations, art 62-66. 
 
45 ESA Regulations, art 69. 
 
46 ESA Regulations, art 37. 
 
47 ESA Regulations, art 21. 
 
48 ESA Regulations, art 54-57. 
 
49 ESA Regulations, art 17. 
 
50 ESA Regulations, art 18. 
 
51 ESA Regulations, art 19. 
 
52 ESA Regulations, art 9. These practices will have to be specifically indicated in new regulations or 
directives on financial services. At present, a so-called omnibus directive has been adopted, but does 
not contain particular innovative consumer oriented prohibition options, see Directive 2010/78/EU of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 
2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), [2010] O.J., L 331/120. A proposal for an Omnibus II directive remains rather 
limited in that respect as well, see <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0008:FIN:EN:PDF>. See also Directive 
2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, [2011] O.J. L 174/ 1for additional powers for ESMA to adopt 
guidelines concerning remuneration policies. 
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EU’s substantive financial law framework are directly applicable to financial institutions 
and where national supervisory authorities did not take appropriate action. Binding 
individual decisions remain an ultimum remedium in that respect. These decisions are 
always supposedly addressed to individual supervisors or market participants and are 
not general in nature. The ESAs remain competent to adopt general guidelines and 
recommendations with a view to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory 
practices and to ensure a common, uniform, and consistent application of Union law.53 
Guidelines and recommendations are non-binding: competent national authorities and 
financial institutions shall make every effort to comply with them and can be obliged to 
report in a clear and detailed way on their compliance. 
In addition to their supervisory roles, the authorities are involved in preparing, drafting, 
and, in most instances, semi-adopting regulatory and implementing technical 
standards.54 According to the ESA regulations, technical standards do not imply 
strategic decisions or policy choices. They implement requirements imposed by level 1 
Acts. The process of drafting these Acts allows little latitude for the European 
Commission and basically charges the ESAs with the authority to develop legislation in 
the field. The Commission mainly adopts these standards by means of Regulations or 
Decisions, but can also object to particular standards. In that case however, the ESAs 
almost always retain the final word on the contents of these standards.55 The drafting of 
these standards is also supported by consultations of market participants, who have 
been granted participation rights in the decision-making process. 
The most important innovation comprises the introduction of remedies in the ESA 
Regulations, as the following sections will demonstrate. These remedies have elevated 
the operations of former level three committees firmly outside the shadows of EU law 
and into the framework of the EU rule of law. 
3. Judicial Protection Against ESA Decisions 
Dedicated attention to rights and remedies is, in the author’s view, the most remarkable 
structural innovation in the ESA Regulations. Unfortunately, it is largely ignored in the 
vast regulatory reform context. The ESA Regulations seek to ‘ensure that the parties 
                                                          
53 ESA Regulations, art 16. 
 
54 These procedures reflect the new delegated and implementing Acts in arts 290-291 TFEU. Delegated 
Acts are based upon the legislative Act, which explicitly defines the objectives, content, scope and 
duration of the delegation. On art 290 TFEU, see Johannes Driessen, ‘Delegated legislation after the Treaty 
of Lisbon: An Analysis of Article 290 TFEU’ (2010) 35 EL Rev 837-848. In adopting delegated acts related 
to financial services, the Commission will nevertheless continue to rely on experts, as Declaration 39 on 
art 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states, see [2008] O.J. C 115/350. 
Implementing acts on the other hand confer the Commission, supervised by the Council and the European 
Parliament, specific powers to implement EU legislative acts, a competence normally attributed to 
Member States. On implementing acts, see Jean Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political 
Analysis, (CUP 2010) 103. Implementing acts will be adopted in accordance the newly updated comitology 
procedure in Regulation 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, [2011] O.J. L 55/13. 
 
55 ESA Regulations, art 10-15. On the delegated lawmaking procedures in arts 290-291 TFEU and their 
roles in financial regulation, Gabriela Diezhandino, ‘A New EU Institutional Balance in the Delegation of 
Legislative and Implementing Powers: An Insurance Perspective. Overview of the changes brought by the 
Lisbon treaty and the new European Supervisory Architecture’ (2011) Euredia 217-239. 
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affected by decisions adopted by the Authorities may have recourse to the necessary 
remedies’.56 To this end, they introduce a two-stage review procedure:  
To protect effectively the rights of parties, and for reasons of procedural 
economy, where the Authority has decision-making powers, parties should 
be granted a right of appeal to a Board of Appeal. For reasons of efficiency 
and consistency, the Board of Appeal should be a joint body of the ESAs, 
independent from their administrative and regulatory structures. The 
decisions of the Board of Appeal should be subject to appeal before the Court 
of Justice.57 
The ESA Regulations build upon these premises by stating that any natural or legal 
person (including competent national authorities) may appeal against a decision58 of 
the Authority related to a breach of Union law procedure, an emergency procedure, or a 
supervisors’ disagreement settlement. Additionally, any other decision taken by the 
Authority in accordance with its powers granted in specific financial services legislation 
referred to in Article 1 (2) could also be the subject of an appeal. Appeals may be 
brought by the person which is addressed in the decision, or who is directly and 
individually concerned by a decision not addressed to him. In order to be admissible, 
the appeal has to be lodged in writing, within two months of notification or (website) 
publication and should state the grounds of appeal.59 
To the extent that an appeal is admissible, the Board will verify whether it is well-
founded, inviting the parties to the proceedings to file observations on its own 
notifications or on communications from other parties and to make oral 
representations. Time limits for interventions and oral representations will be 
determined by the rules of procedure. Lodging an appeal does not as such suspend the 
application of an authority’s decision; if the circumstances so require, the authority can 
nevertheless suspend the decision’s application.60 The regulations provide similar 
Board of Appeal review in cases related to (refusal of) access to documents.61 
                                                          
56 ESA Regulations, recital 58. 
 
57 ESA Regulations, recital 58. 
 
58The notion of decision is problematic in EU law. Whereas art 288 TFEU refers to the individuality of 
decisions, the notion incorporates different meanings in procedural law, where it mainly serves as a 
synonym for reviewable act, a notion applied in art 263 TFEU. On that discussion and the transformation 
from decision to act, see Hans Christian Röhl, ‘The voidable decision of art 230 (4) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community as a form of legal protection’ in Oswald Jansen and and Bettina 
Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.), The European Composite Administration (Intersentia, 2011) 412. 
 
59 ESA Regulations, art 60. 
 
60 ESA Regulations, art 60 (3) and (4). 
 
61 ESA Regulations, art 72 states that Regulation 1049/2001 applies to the ESAs. The management boards 
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The Board of Appeal shall adopt a reasoned decision that is to be made public. Its 
decisions shall be taken by a majority of at least four of its six members. At least one 
member appointed by the ESA to which the appeal procedure relates, should be part of 
that majority. The Board may confirm the decision taken by the competent body of the 
Authority or remit the case to that body (i.e. the Board of Supervisors or the 
management board). That body shall be bound by the decision of the Board of Appeal 
and shall adopt an amended decision regarding the case concerned. In that particular 
case, the ESA body is bound to adopt a particular decision.62 The Board cannot (re-
)adopt a particular decision itself.63 
Decisions by the Board of Appeal, or in case no access to that Board is available, 
decisions taken by the Authorities or their bodies can be brought before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. These proceedings occur in accordance with the action 
for annulment proceedings as presented in Article 263 TFEU.64 Member States and 
Union Institutions can bring actions against ESA decisions, as well as natural or legal 
persons to whom the decision was addressed or who are directly and individually 
concerned by that decision.65 The Court’s Statute determines that the actions will have 
to be brought by individuals before the General Court. The same goes for Member States 
actions against ESAs’ decisions.66 The European Court of Justice would then only be able 
to review these decisions on points of law.67 According to Article 263 TFEU, parties can 
initiate proceedings on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to 
their application, or misuse of powers. ‘In the event that an Authority has an obligation 
to act and fails to take a decision, proceedings for failure to act may be brought before 
the Court of Justice as well, in that case in accordance with Article 265 TFEU.68 
4. Inconsistencies in Judicial Review of ESA Decisions 
Despite their apparent clarity of scope, particular elements of the ESA remedies’ system 
present inconsistencies in the overall scope of protection offered by the Board of Appeal 
and by the Court of Justice. 
Firstly, the scope of individuals’ access to the Board of Appeal appears to be 
inconsistent with the general standing requirements, restricting direct access of 
                                                          
62 ESA Regulations, art 60 (5) – (7). 
 
63 As had originally been conceived, see J. V. Louis (n 8) 165. 
 
64 The procedural provisions of art 263 incorporate the particular grounds of review (see 4.3.2.) and the 
obligation to institute proceedings within a period of two months following notification or knowledge of a 
decision producing legal effects. 
 
65 ESA Regulations, art 61 (1) and (2). 
 
66 Combined reading of art 256 (1) TFEU and art 51 Statute of the European Court of Justice. 
 
67 Art 58 Statute of the European Court of Justice: Appeals shall lie on the grounds of lack of competence 
of the General Court, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant 
as well as the infringement of Union law by the General Court. 
 
68 ESA Regulations, art 61(3). The same procedural conditions apply to arts 263 and 265 actions. In the 
remainder of this Article, I only refer to art 263 or annulment procedures. 
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individuals to the European Courts. Secondly, the system allows both Member States’ 
governments and their independent national supervisory authorities to initiate judicial 
proceedings without considering interactions or frictions between a Member State and 
‘its’ supervisory authority. Thirdly, the scope of review entertained by the Board of 
Appeal does not seem to conform to the Court’s scope of review projected in Article 263 
TFEU. 
4.1.  Less stringent individual access to the Board of Appeal and to the      
General Court? 
The ESA Regulations are particularly ambiguous in delineating the scope of individual 
access to the Board of Appeal. Although they rely on familiar categories of direct69 and 
individual70 concern, the extent to which these standing conditions apply to ESA 
decisions is fraught with uncertainty. Article 60 of the ESA Regulations allows a natural 
or legal person to obtain Board of Appeal review when a decision is addressed to that 
person, or in alternative cases, whenever a person is directly and individually 
concerned. Leaving aside discussions on the scope and identification of an ESA 
decision,71 the Regulations distinguish Article 17, 18, and 19 decisions (breach of Union 
law, emergency situations, and settlement of supervisory disputes) from other decisions 
based on substantive financial services Regulations or Directives (the substantive law 
framework).72 The grammatical construction of the text leaves it unclear whether the 
individual addressee or direct and individual concern requirements apply to both types 
of decisions. Article 60 (1) states that: 
[a]ny natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against 
a decision of the Authority referred to in Articles 17, 18 and 19 and any other 
decision taken by the Authority in accordance with the Union acts as referred to in 
Article 1(2) which is addressed to that person,73 or against a decision which, 
although not in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to that person. 
While one would be tempted to argue that conditions of direct and individual concern 
apply to both types of decisions, the lack of a comma between the second type of 
                                                          
69 The Court has consistently defined a Union measure to be of direct concern if the contested measure 
directly affects the legal situation of the individual and leaves no discretion to its addressees, allowing for 
merely automatic implementation resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate 
rules, see Case C-386/96 P, Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, para 43; Case C-486/01 P, Front 
National v Parliament, [2004] ECR I-6289, para 34; Case C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana v Commission 
[2006] ECR I-3881, para 28. 
 
70 A person to whom a decision is not addressed is individually concerned only if that decision affects him 
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to him or by reason of circumstances in which he is 
differentiated from all other persons and, by virtue of these factors, distinguishes him individually just as 
in the case of the person addressed, see Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, [1963] ECR 95, 107. 
 
71 See Hans Christian Röhl (n 58) 416-419 for reflections on that role. 
 
72 The substantive law (referred to in that way by Takis Tridimas (n 8) 799) framework encapsulates the 
overall set of financial law provisions adopted at the EU level referred to in art 1(2) of the ESA 
Regulations. These provisions substantiate and determine concrete competences of ESAs in particular 
situations. 
 
73 Emphasis is the author’s.  
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decisions and ‘which is addressed to’ might at least invite another interpretation, as 
comma before a ‘which’ construction normally indicates a non-restrictive subordinate 
clause. A ‘which is addressed to’ construction immediately following Article 1(2) would 
however restrict the scope of being individually addressed to that type of decisions. 
That would also imply that the conditions of direct and individual concern apply only to 
that category of decisions. In line with such interpretation, any decision taken by the 
Authority in accordance with the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) can be appealed 
by an individual if addressed to it. To the extent the decision is not addressed to the 
appellate party, direct and individual concern would provide alternative access to the 
Board. A decision of the Authority based on Articles 17, 18 and 19 could on the contrary, 
be appealed by any natural or legal person without that recourse being limited to the 
addressee or a person directly and individually concerned. 
Constitutionally, this approach presents a viable alternative. Article 263(5) TFEU states 
that:  
acts setting up bodies, offices or agencies of the Union may lay down specific 
conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal 
persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce 
legal effects in relation to them. 
The abovementioned interpretation would precisely support specific conditions: they 
allow any natural or legal person and competent national authority to obtain review for 
any Article 17, 18 and 19 decision, even if not directly addressed to them and even if 
they are not directly or individually concerned. That interpretation would introduce a 
new approach to individual standing before the Board of Appeal in the ESA Regulations. 
More lenient Board of Appeal access standards would thus be introduced for Article 17, 
18 and19 decisions but not for other ESA decisions. Should this interpretation become 
generally accepted, the Court might even be willing to extend this interpretation to 
systems of judicial review against other regulatory agencies. 
This interpretation is nevertheless countenanced by the Regulations’ preambles, by 
other language versions, and by the overall access to court approach entertained by the 
Court of Justice. The ESA Regulations preambles refer to ‘parties’ that should have 
recourse to the necessary remedies in all instances. As such, the Regulations would 
seem to require similar addressee or concern requirements for all types of decisions.74 
In the same way, the French version states that every natural or legal person can: 
former un recours contre une décision de l’Autorité visée aux articles 17, 18 
et 19 et toute autre décision arrêtée parl’Autorité conformément aux actes de 
l’Union visés à l’article 1er, paragraphe 2, dont elle est le destinataire […]. 
The comma following ‘paragraphe 2’ seems to highlight that the individuality and as a 
result, requirements of direct and individual concern requirements apply to all 
decisions amenable to Board of Appeal review. The German and Spanish language 
versions support this approach.75 
                                                          
74 ESA Regulations, recital 58 states that ‘[i]t is necessary to ensure that the parties affected by decisions 
adopted by the Authority may have recourse to the necessary remedies. In individual decisions, this 
refers to the individuals affected by those decisions and not just any third party’. 
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A general application of (direct and) individual concern requirements is more 
consistent with the limited access of individuals the Court of Justice has maintained 
throughout its case law.76 In light of preceding case law, it would be surprising if the 
Court readily acknowledged the general standing for any person against an Article 17, 
18, and 19 decision. If that were the case, the Court would indirectly broaden individual 
Court access, as non-admissibility Board of Appeal decisions could be reviewed by the 
General Court. 
Article 60(1) leaves too much uncertainty to adopt such extension, but it ultimately also 
allows for the possibility of that extension. It would therefore be advisable that the 
Board of Appeal (and ultimately, the Court itself) establishes clarity on these grounds 
and develop an authoritative interpretation of Article 60. The scope of access would also 
gain much clarity from the insertion of a comma in the English language version. 
4.2.  Member States and/versus National Supervisory Authorities 
The ESA Regulations allow national financial supervisory authorities to initiate 
proceedings before the Board of Appeal. National supervisory authorities play a crucial 
role in the implementation and application of EU financial law provisions. As 
independent supervisors, they form part – in different degrees of directness – of 
Member States’ systems of administrative organisation.77 The ESA Regulations 
nevertheless specifically distinguish them from Member States at large. Article 17, 18, 
and19 decisions will be directed to individual competent supervisory authorities and 
not to individual Member States. That authority can subsequently obtain judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
75 Both versions introduce a comma: gegen einen gemäß den Artikeln 17, 18 und 19 getroffenen Beschluss 
der Behörde, gegen jeden anderen von der Behörde gemäß den in Artikel 1 Absatz 2 genannten Rechtsakten 
der Union getroffenen, an sie gerichteten Beschluss and el artículo 1, apartado 2, de las que sea destinataria. 
 
76 The Court maintained a strict interpretation of direct and individual concern ever since case 25/62, 
Plaumann v Commission, [1963] ECR 95, 107. The ECJ refused to extend the standing conditions for 
individuals in Case C-50/00 P Unión de PéqueñosAgricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, and rebuked 
the then Court of First Instance in its willingness to allow individual access in case of non-individual acts 
against which no review before national judges was possible (Case T-177/01, JégoQuéré v Commission 
[2002] ECR II-2365). The Court subsequently shifted towards national judges and their obligation to 
provide remedies, see e.g. case C-432/05, Unibet, [2007] ECR I-2271. On this issue, see among others 
Marie-Pierre Granger, ‘Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking Judicial 
Review of Community Acts: JégoQuéré et Cie SA v Commission and Unión de PéqueñosAgricultores v 
Council’, (2003) 66 MLR  124-138. 
 
77 On the requirements of autonomy and independence, the ECJ ruled in a case on data protection that ‘the 
supervisory authorities responsible for supervising the processing of personal data outside the public 
sector must enjoy an independence allowing them to perform their duties free from external influence. 
That independence precludes not only any influence exercised by the supervised bodies, but also any 
directions or any other external influence, whether direct or indirect, which could call into question the 
performance by those authorities of their task consisting of establishing a fair balance between the 
protection of the right to private life and the free movement of personal data’, see case C-518/07, 
Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-0000, para 30. See also the Opinion of AG Mazák, para 14-29. 
Whether this judgment constitutes a precedent for all independent national supervisors – i.e. outside the 
data protection context – is unclear, as the Court interpreted the conditions of independence in light of 
the directive’s referral to that concept. On the other hand, the Advocate General did indeed refer to 
independence as a functional concept applicable to all supervisory authorities, see para 13-14. The 
independence notions have indeed been repeated in a different setting by Case C-119/09, Société 
fiduciaire nationale d'expertise comptable, judgment of 5 April 2011, Opinion of AG Mazák, para 54. 
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protection against ESA decisions if addressed to them. To the extent that those decisions 
are not addressed to them, the generally accepted interpretation of Article 60 allows 
them to have access to the Board if they are directly and individually concerned by the 
decision adopted. Member States and Union Institutions cannot commence proceedings 
before the Board, as the ESA regulations (and the TFEU) distinguish them from natural 
or legal persons.78 National supervisory authorities thus represent Member States’ 
interests or concerns before the Board of Appeal. At the level of the Court of Justice, 
Member States are invited directly to engage in proceedings against ESA decisions. 
Member States are considered privileged applicants and therefore do not have to 
demonstrate any direct and/or individual concern to obtain standing before the Court.79 
Questions arise as to the extent to which the interests and representative actions of 
national competent authorities and Member States can and should be equated in Board 
of Appeal and Court proceedings. National competent authorities have to lodge actions 
before the Board in most circumstances, but Member States have not been granted the 
same opportunity. In case of decisions adversely affecting their interests, the latter 
could therefore directly commence proceedings before the General Court. In instances 
where an individual decision addressed against a national supervisory authority cannot 
be contested by a particular supervisory authority for lack of direct and individual 
concern, the Member State concerned could directly address the General Court instead. 
To the extent that the national supervisory authority is involved in representing the 
Member State before the General Court, any reliance on the Board of Appeal procedure 
by a supervisory authority would be superfluous. The Board of Appeal stage would only 
remain obligatory if an ESA decision is directly addressed to that national supervisory 
authority. The Member State to which the supervisory authority belongs would 
nevertheless also be able to initiate proceedings before the General Court without being 
obliged to engage in Board of Appeal proceedings. Both the national authority and ‘its’ 
Member State would thus be able to initiate proceedings against a similar decision. In 
appellate proceedings by a national authority following a Board of Appeal decision 
addressed to it, ‘its’ Member State could still independently intervene to clarify its own 
position or to support its authority, which is a party to the proceedings.80 
The abovementioned hypothetical situations seem to hold only on the presumption that 
Member States and their independent national supervisory authorities project different 
interests or at least could do so for the purposes of obtaining judicial review against ESA 
decisions. The presumption of different interests is not however reflected in the 
underlying organisational framework of the ESA Regulations. Firstly, Member States are 
only represented by their national supervisory authorities in the Board of Supervisors. 
In addition, the ESAs settle disputes between national supervisory authorities, without 
elevating these disputes to the political realm of Council decision-making and thus 
bringing the Member States in to check the interests supervisory authorities might have 
in that particular case. More practically, decision-making procedures and the qualified 
majority requirements apply in similar ways as to Member States themselves. The 
Council is not represented in the deliberations of the ESAs, contrary to the Commission, 
but national supervisory authorities enjoy voting rights similar to the ones held by 
                                                          
78 ESA Regulations art 60(1) and art 61(2). 
 
79As apparent from art 263(1) TFEU. 
 
80 Art 40 Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
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Member States in the Council. References to both national supervisory authorities and 
Member States as presumably differently interested process parties in the remedies 
sections of the ESA Regulations therefore appear inconsistent with the overall ESA 
decision-making scheme. 
The Court of Justice’s approach to the scope of a Member State in Article 263 TFEU 
might however favour differential standing conditions for Member States and their 
national supervisory authorities. The Court does not equate a Member State and its 
decentralised authorities like federated states for purposes of the Article 263 TFEU 
action for annulment.81 The latter have to demonstrate direct concern in relation to 
regulatory acts and direct and individual concern in relation to other types of acts or 
decisions not directly addressed to them.82 References to both supervisory authorities 
and Member States could therefore be interpreted as an explicit invitation to distinguish 
the standing conditions for national supervisory authorities from the privileged 
Member State standing requirements. The independence of national supervisory 
authorities, as interpreted by Advocate General Mazàk in Commission v Germany could 
also be understood as confirmation of such argument. The Advocate General stated that 
independence should be applied ‘in relation to other parts of the executive, of which 
they form an integral part, and to a degree that ensures that their functions are 
exercised effectively’.83 The Executive would comprise all directly dependent 
departments as inherent parts of a Member State, whereas independent supervisory 
authorities, performing an executive function, could not be equated with the Member 
State as such. 
Two arguments could nevertheless be adduced to question that understanding of 
independence. First and specifically, the Advocate General and the Court in the 
Commission v Germany stated that independence should not be compared to judicial 
independence, because ‘independence in exercising their functions must be defined only 
in the context of the executive and not in relation to the other branches of the State’.84 
That position seems to presuppose a ‘unitary executive’ from the Court of Justice’s 
standing point of view. All parts of a Member States’ executive, no matter whether they 
act as independent authorities, are part of the Member State level having privileged 
standing before the European Courts. As national supervisory authorities in most cases 
operate at the central executive level, they thus inherently form part of the ‘Member 
State’. Second and more generally, a distinction between a Member State and its 
supervisory authority would render the scope of privileged ‘Member State’ applicants 
too narrow. Only those parts of the Executive immediately accountable to executive 
decision makers could still be considered a Member State for privileged applicant 
status. If that were the case, how does one define directly accountable decision makers? 
                                                          
81 See on that issue and for an overview of case law, Piet Van Nuffel, ‘What’s in a Member State? Central 
and Decentralized Authorities before the Community Courts’ (2001) 38 CML Rev. 871-901. Somewhat 
contradictory, the Court does apply an equation in actions taken against infringements of EU law by the 
European Commission and subsequently the Court of Justice, see Ibid., 883. 
 
82 In accordance with art 263 (4) TFEU, see also Koen Lenaerts, Dirk Arts, Ignace Maselis and Robert Bray 
(ed.), Procedural Law of the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 243. 
 
83 Opinion AG Mazák, Commission v Germany (n 77) para. 23. 
 
84 Opinion AG Mazák, Commission v Germany (n 77) para. 23; Case C-518/07, Commission v Germany, para. 
19. 
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In addition, many regulatory disputes would potentially remain sealed from direct 
appeals before the European Courts, which would endanger the system of complete 
judicial protection in relation to Member State structures. It would in that respect 
become difficult for national supervisory authorities directly to initiate proceedings 
against actions taken by EU regulatory agencies that affect their legal position without 
them being individually addressed as such. The alignment of interests between a 
Member State and independent authorities as part of its Executive therefore seems to 
present the most feasible option in a system aiming for more complete legal control. 
To the extent that a Member State and ‘its’ national supervisory authority should thus 
entertain similar or equal interests as a matter of EU law, references to both Member 
States and national authorities in the ESA remedies’ sections could be interpreted in 
ways that minimise potential collusion of interests in court proceedings. One particular 
solution could be to initiate proceedings through the national competent authority in 
cases where decisions are addressed to it or where that authority has standing before 
the Board because of direct and individual concern, but to grant Member States the 
right directly to initiate proceedings before the Court in cases of decisions where the 
supervisory authority could not first act before the Board. The two month time period 
to initiate Court proceedings should then only start following a decision of non-
admissibility by the Board of Appeal, unless Board of Appeal precedents clearly imply 
that the national supervisory authority would not gain standing before the Board in this 
kind of dispute.85 Only in those instances should direct court proceedings be initiated, in 
which a member of the national supervisory authority could represent the Member 
State qua Member State. 
The Court of Justice will thus have to establish the extent to which the roles of national 
supervisory authorities and Member States align or differ in the context of ESA 
remedies. Although in both instances particular avenues for judicial review remain 
open, a consistent involvement of Member States and their supervisory authorities 
could be preferred. Judicial clarification is therefore most welcome here. 
4.3. The Scope of Review by the Board of Appeal 
The scope of review presents additional inconsistencies. Scope of review could be 
understood in two ways, either referring to the categories of reviewable decisions or to 
the substantive bases for review. In both situations, the ESA Regulations appear to 
detract from long standing Treaty interpretations delineating the scope of judicial 
review in EU law. 
 
                                                          
85 Those instances will only gradually become clear in the Board of Appeal’s case law. This reasoning 
could be based on the Court’s case law on the obligations to refer a question for preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of EU law by a Member State court. Although making a reference is obligatory in cases 
where no judicial remedy is available according to art 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice fashioned exceptions 
in case of identical questions, questions the answer to which can clearly be deduced from the case law 
and situations where the correct application of Union law are so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved. Case 283/81, Cilfit, 
[1982] ECR 3415, para. 13-16 and para. 21. More recently, see Case C-461/03, Gaston Schul, [2005] ECR I-
10513, para. 16-19; Case C-260/07, Pedro IV Servicios, [2009] ECR I-2437, para. 36. In cases where the 
scope of standing for particular types of decisions has become so clear as to render the application before 
the Board useless for lack of standing, direct appeals to the Court by the Member States could be 
preferred. 
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4.3.1.     Categories of Decisions Amenable to Review 
On the one hand, the categories of decisions against which judicial review can be 
organized are confusing in some cases. According to the ESA Regulations, decisions not 
amenable to Board of Appeal review can be directly appealed before the Court of Justice 
in accordance with Article 263 TFEU.86 The number of decisions of this kind is 
purportedly limited as all decision-making activity incorporated in EU substantive 
financial law is amenable to Board review. The following decisions can be directly 
appealed to the Court: a decision to publish reasons for non-compliance with 
guidelines,87 dispute settlement in relation to colleges of supervisors,88 decisions 
appointing members of the Securities and Markets Stakeholders Group,89 decisions 
removing the Executive Director and decisions on the appointment and removal of 
members of the Board of Appeal.90 
Two types of decisions stand out for their potentially atypical reviewability. Firstly, 
decisions appointing and removing the Chairperson and appointing the Executive 
Director are excluded from Board of Appeal review.91 Those decisions require the 
approval of the European Parliament, potentially rendering them attributable to the 
Parliament rather than to the Authority. Secondly, Article 9 of the ESA Regulations 
refers to consumer financial protection and allows for the temporary restriction or 
prohibition of certain activities. Restricting or prohibiting activities is not explicitly 
referred to as a ground for Board of Appeal review in Article 60, however the actual 
restriction or prohibition options have to be specified by substantive law acts and thus 
originate in those acts. ESA decision powers in these acts are included in the group of 
decisions reviewable by the Board of Appeal through Article 1(2) of the ESA 
Regulations. 
This understanding of the scope of review does not pose particular problems because of 
the broad group of decisions included. The decisions not included in the group of 
reviewable decisions could only be extended through legislative adaptation. At present, 
they result from a legislative choice. It could nevertheless be questioned why Board of 
Appeal review does not include some of the abovementioned types of decisions, for 
instance decisions to publish reasons for guideline non-compliance. No particular 
justifications seem to have been offered in this regard. 
4.3.2.     Grounds of review 
On the other hand, the Regulations do not specifically mention the concrete grounds of 
Board of Appeal review. More specifically, the substantive and procedural arguments 
that can be invoked and the extent to which these arguments differ from those in Article 
                                                          
86 ESA Regulations, art 61 (1). 
 
87 ESA Regulations, art 16. 
 
88 ESA Regulations, art 21. 
 
89 ESA Regulations, art 37. 
 
90 ESA Regulations, art 58. 
 
91 ESA Regulations, art 48 (2) and 51 (2). 
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263 TFEU remain absent. Article 263 TFEU limits the Court’s scope of review to grounds 
of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their application or misuse of 
powers.92 As such, the grounds for annulment are broad, but remain limited to a legality 
control, without the Court being able to assess the opportunity of the substance of a 
particular decision. To some extent, it appears that the Board of Appeal was on the 
contrary, mandated to do so or could at least perceive its role in that way. The original 
Commission proposals for the creation of ESAs granted the Board the power to ‘exercise 
any competence which lies in the competence of the Authority’, thus allowing it to adopt 
new substantive decisions. The Council arranged for the removal of that provision, 
leaving the ESA Regulations with a mere option to confirm an ESA’s decision or remit 
the case to the ESA.93 The composition of the Board similarly requires members with 
‘sufficient legal expertise to provide expert legal advice on the legality of the Authority’s 
exercise of powers’.94 It would thus appear that the Board’s role would also be confined 
to assessing the legality of ESA decisions. If the Board of Appeal and the Court of Justice 
were to apply similar review standards, the Board of Appeal could rely on the Court’s 
case law to determine the scope of its own review initiatives. From a consistency 
perspective, this should be welcomed as the Board would then be able to mirror the 
Court’s annulment role. The Board of Appeal’s particular competence to remit a case to 
the competent ESA body additionally enables it informally to assess the opportunity of 
the decision and perhaps to deliver suggestions on how that body should decide in case 
it wants to avoid annulment by the Court of Justice. The Board of Appeal itself or the 
Court of Justice should therefore clearly determine how this mirror approach should be 
applied in the case of ESA decisions. 
4.4.  Summary of Inconsistencies Requiring Clarification 
The following table summarises the inconsistencies identified and solutions proposed in 
the foregoing subsections: 
 Judicial clarification Legislative adaptation 
Individual Access Types of decisions 
requiring individual 
concern 
Comma input in English 
language version 
(Member State) Authorities Presumption of alignment 
of interests among Member 
States and their 
authorities? 
 
Scope of Review Mirroring Treaty grounds 
of review? 
Clarifying categories not 
amenable to Board review 
 
 
                                                          
92 All grounds basically amount to testing the legality and not the opportunity of the decisions taken. The 
focus on legality has been confirmed by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion to Case C-210/98 P, 
Salzgitter v Commission, [2000] ECR I-5843, para 135. 
 
93 J.V. Louis (n 8) 165. 
 
94 ESA Regulations, art 58 (2). 
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5. Gaps in judicial protection against ESA decisions 
In addition to textual ambiguities and ensuing inconsistencies, the system of judicial 
protection inaugurated by the ESA Regulations presents gaps as well. Firstly, guidelines 
and recommendations are excluded from the scope of judicial protection, even if they 
affect the positions of market participants. Secondly, the ESAs’ roles in preparing and 
developing regulatory and implementing technical standards remains undervalued 
from a judicial protection perspective. Legitimate expectations created by market 
participants’ involvement in an ESA consultation procedure might be difficult to enforce 
before judges assessing the legality of technical standards formally adopted by the 
European Commission. Thirdly, uncertainty about the scope of market participants’ 
‘rights’ to engage in stakeholder consultations and standards’ preparations highlights 
additional potential gaps in the remedies framework. 
5.1.  Guidelines and recommendations 
In addition to binding individual decisions, the ESA Regulations allow the Authorities to 
adopt guidelines and recommendations.95 These instruments can be general in scope 
and are non-binding.96 Competent national authorities shall make every effort to 
comply with the guidelines and recommendations, but remain free not doing so in 
specific cases. The regulations specify that national authorities have to confirm whether 
or not they will comply with the guideline or recommendation. The fact of compliance 
or non-compliance shall be published. Financial institutions could also be required to 
report in a clear and detailed way whether they comply with a guideline or 
recommendation. Any reason for national authorities’ or financial institutions’ non-
compliance can be published in particular instances on a case-by-case basis.97 
At first sight, guidelines and recommendations are mere soft law standards not 
amenable to judicial review. The ESA Regulations nevertheless ‘proceduralised’ familiar 
soft law characteristics to an extent that would allow judicial review in particular 
instances. Firstly, non-compliance with reporting obligations by national authorities or 
financial institutions could entice publication of the reasons for non-compliance. The 
decision to publish these reasons could be considered a decision subject to direct 
judicial review before the General Court. Beyond the reviewability of a decision to 
publish, the ESA could commence a procedure for breach of Union law provided in 
Articles 17 of the ESA Regulations. Throughout these procedures, the Court would be 
invited to assess the legality of the procedures followed, but could also indirectly engage 
in more substantive legality review of the guidelines or recommendations adopted. 
Secondly, the adoption of guidelines requires a particular approval procedure: national 
authorities have to notify the extent to which they will comply with these guidelines. In 
                                                          
95 Guidelines and recommendations are relied on in other financial regulatory decisions as well. The 
recent Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive demonstrates this in arts 13 (2), 34 (3), 35 
(12), 36 (4), 37 (16), 38, 40 (12), 42 (4), 44 and 47 of Directive 2011/61/EU (n 2) where guidelines are 
the instruments to be adopted by ESMA (or EBA). 
 
96 ESA Regulations, art 16; see on the effects of formally non-binding legal norms in EU law, Francis 
Snyder, ‘Soft law and Institutional Practice in the EC’ in Stephen Martin (ed.), The construction of Europe. 
Essays in honour of Emile Noël (Kluwer, 1994), 197- 226; Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community 
Law (Hart 2004). 
 
97 ESA Regulations, art 16 (3). 
ELSA MALTA LAW REVIEW 
 
Edition II, 2012. 251 
 
case of full compliance by all authorities involved, national supervisors agree with a 
supranational non-binding norm, and, in so doing, turn it into a de facto binding 
supranational legal standard. It could in that regard be defended that these guidelines 
and recommendations as such become reviewable standards. Earlier case law 
confirmed that form does not matter for purposes of judicial review, as the Court 
derives the existence of an act from its content, implying that the act could be invoked 
as long as it is intended to produce legal effects.98 It could therefore be argued that 
notices of compliance with those guidelines by all national authorities produce similar 
effects as regulations or decisions adopted by the Commission, as all Member States are 
bound by a Union agency’s measure. Review based on Article 263 TFEU could therefore 
be open against these guidelines or recommendations. That requires one to assert 
direct and individual concern or at least direct concern should these guidelines or 
recommendations qualify as ‘regulatory acts’ (see also 5.2.). 
A similar analysis is difficult to uphold in cases where only a majority of Member States 
committed to comply. Could it still be maintained that guidelines or recommendations 
produce binding effects as a matter of Union law? After all, a minority of Member States 
indicated their non-compliance and therefore they do not consider themselves bound 
by those guidelines as a matter of national law. Could other market participants still 
maintain that those provisions are binding for them as a matter of EU law, because 
some (including ‘their’) Member States’ authorities rubberstamped them? It is well-
known that national administrative authorities have to apply EU law and discard 
national provisions,99 but that strand of case law does not provide an answer for the 
situation in which actions of a national supervisory authority would transform non-
binding guidelines or recommendations into seemingly binding EU standards 
emanating from a general acceptance of these guidelines. 
It would therefore be more feasible to consider the legal effects and review options of 
guidelines and recommendations from a national law perspective.100 Guidelines and 
                                                          
98 This has been confirmed by the General Court in relation to agencies’ decisions in Case T-411/06, 
Sogelma, [2008] ECR II-2771, para.37 and para 48: ‘[…] an act emanating from a Community body 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties cannot escape judicial review by the Community 
judicature’. According to art 19 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the Court of Justice 
ensures that the law is observed in the application of the Treaties. The Court of Justice has long held that 
this commitment to the law implies that the European Union maintains a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted 
by the Institutions. Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v EuropeanParliament, [1986] ECR 1339, para 
23. The introduction of remedies against regulatory agencies’ decisions expresses a similar commitment 
to observing the law; see Case C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust, [2005] ECR I-2077, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 
17. 
 
99 The Court’s case law on this matter is voluminous and evolving, to the extent that it might require 
reopening of administrative decisions: see among others Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo, [1989] ECR 
1893, para 31; case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, [2004] ECR I-837, para 26-28 and case C-2/06, Kempter, 
[2008] ECR I-411, para 55 establishing duties for national administrative authorities or judges to review 
cases at the administrative level while discarding national law provisions in favor of EU law. See also J. 
Komárek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System – Building Coherence in the Community 
Legal Order', (2005) 42 CML Rev. 9 - 34; M. Verhoeven, ‘The Costanzo Obligation and the Principle of 
National Institutional Autonomy: Supervision as a Bridge to Close the Gap?’, (2010) 3 Review of European 
Administrative Law 23-64; M. Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation: the obligations of national 
administrative authorities in the case of incompatibility between national law and European law 
(Intersentia, 2011). 
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recommendations have to be applied primarily by national authorities and by financial 
institutions operating under the laws of the national legal systems. In the practice of 
day-to-day supervision, those guidelines will have to be incorporated into (or coupled 
with) the existing EU and national legal frameworks of financial supervision. To the 
extent that guidelines produce interpretative standards of EU regulatory or 
implementing technical standards, it can be maintained that they add another layer to 
EU and national provisions that should become part of judicial analysis in supervisory 
disputes. These disputes could arise before national judges, in cases involving national 
supervisory practices, or before the Court, in references for a preliminary ruling in 
those cases. Guidelines and recommendations will thus have to be coupled to other 
national or EU legal standards more readily amenable to judicial review. The coupling 
assessment will most readily have to be made by national judges, who will then refer 
the case to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In cases referred to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling, the ESA that adopted the guidelines should be 
notified and thus invited to intervene to clarify the boundaries of the reference made.101 
A uniquely national law perspective nevertheless presents additional difficulties. It calls 
upon national judges to interpret or apply de facto supranational guidelines and 
recommendations in differentiated national settings. A particularly tailored remedy for 
that problem could therefore be the introduction of the ESAs as amicus curiae in 
national court proceedings concerning these guidelines and recommendations.102 
Introducing the ESA as amicus in national law would nevertheless generate particular 
hurdles. On the one hand, the amicus is not familiar to all legal systems, even though the 
EU has introduced a similar regime in competition law matters.103 In addition, the ESA’s 
judicial intervention roles would bring it in direct competition with the European Court 
of Justice and the preliminary ruling system. It would be for the national court to invoke 
the help from either the ESA or the Court or both, depending on the circumstances of 
the case at hand. On the other, one constituent body of the ESA (for instance the Board 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
100 On the potentially fruitful perspectives national judges can and should offer in an EU setting, see W. 
Van Gerven (n 27). 
 
101 Art 23 of the ECJ Statute does indeed provide for this option, also when offices, bodies or agencies 
adopted particular measures having legal effect.  
 
102 An amicus brings a matter before the Court to instruct it on a point of law not covered by the parties. 
Amici should be distinguished from interveners because they do not join pending litigation but rather 
present an additional perspective to the Court, without becoming a party to that dispute, see on the 
Amicus concept in US Federal law, see Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf> accessed April 2012.  
 
103 Art 15 of Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in arts81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1 states that ‘[i]n proceedings for the 
application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, courts of the Member States may ask the Commission 
to transmit to them information in its possession or its opinion on questions concerning the application of 
the Community competition rules’. The national competition authorities are granted similar powers in §3. 
Those options have further been worked out in the Commission Notice on the co-operation between the 
Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of arts81 and 82 EC, [2004] O.J. C 
101/54. For a balanced analysis of the new amicus curiae phenomenon in European competition law, see 
Kathryn Wright, 'European Commission Interventions as Amicus Curiae in National Competition Cases: 
the Preliminary Reference in X BV', (2009) 30 European Competition Law Review 309-313. K. Wright, 
‘European Commission Opinions to National Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application and the 
Judicial-Administrative Relationship’ 21-43 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1210114>accessed April 2012. 
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of Supervisors or the Chairperson) will have to act as amicus curiae in a way to clarify 
the independence and expertise-based structure of that body. The amicus role thus risks 
being extended beyond a consultative introduction of the national judge in the 
particular issues of the case and would allow it to become a judge with regard to 
standards it adopted itself. Any amicus curiae solution should thus be approached with 
care. 
5.2.  Technical Standards and ESAs 
The ESAs’ (future) roles in drafting regulatory and implementing technical standards 
cannot be underestimated. According to the ESA Regulations, regulatory and 
implementing technical standards are formally adopted by the Commission by means of 
Regulations and decisions.104 Since the Commission is the formal addressor of the 
decision, the Board of Appeal of the ESAs cannot be called upon to review these 
measures. The Court of Justice could nevertheless intervene in these matters, as 
technical standards incorporated in Regulations and decisions present legal acts that 
could be challenged following Article 263 TFEU. Questions can firstly be raised in 
relation to the legal nature of these acts and the ensuing scope of standing for Member 
States and individuals. Secondly, the lack of involvement of the ESAs in Article 263 TFEU 
proceedings against technical standards presents a potentially significant enforcement 
gap. 
5.2.1.     Legal Nature of Technical Standards and Standing Requirements 
It is well-known that Member States, individuals and Union Institutions can initiate 
judicial proceedings against regulations and decisions incorporating technical 
standards. Different Member States and their own national supervisory authorities are 
no longer presumed to be potentially different actors: as already mentioned, neither the 
ESA Regulations nor the Treaties provide for specific supervisory authorities’ standing. 
An individual Member State can challenge the acts and could be supported by staff 
members of its independent national supervisory authority in doing so. The national 
supervisory authorities themselves cannot however be considered privileged 
applicants. This contrasts with Board of Appeal procedures and the particular 
involvement of national supervisory authorities therein, and thus potentially presents a 
gap between the effective enforcement of acts adopted and those ‘merely’ drafted by the 
ESAs. In addition, natural or legal persons no longer have to adduce direct concern 
when contesting technical standards. The Lisbon Treaty also introduced more flexible 
standing conditions for ‘regulatory acts’. Individuals can challenge these acts if they are 
of direct concern to them and to the extent that they do not entail implementing 
measures. Whereas the General Court has already held that a directive allowing broad 
Member State discretion does not as such constitute a regulatory act105, the extent to 
which regulations, decisions or directives that confer less Member State discretion are 
of direct concern is still unclear as case law on this subject has thus far remained 
                                                          
104 ESA Regulations, art 10 (4) and art 15 (4). 
 
105 Case T-16/04, Arcelor v European Parliament and Council, [2010] ECR II-211, para 123:  
 
the Member States have a broad discretion with regard to implementation of the contested 
directive. For that reason, contrary to what the applicant contends, that directive cannot, in 
any event, be regarded as being a regulatory act which does not entail implementing 
measures within the terms of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 
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scarce.106 At the very least, individual concern is no longer a prerequisite for 
standing.107 
5.2.2.     ESA Involvement in Technical Standards’ Review Actions 
A truly fundamental gap in technical standards review is the lack of mandatory ESA 
involvement in review proceedings of these standards. The ESAs have held the 
Commission’s pen and have presumably a more intimate and practical knowledge of the 
scope, content and meaning of acts adopting technical standards. In a complete system 
of judicial accountability, the ESAs’ drafting role should not however be neglected with a 
view to assist the Court in determining the scope of illegality adduced in the form of 
order sought. A mandatory procedural intervention, either as defendant in conjunction 
to the European Commission or as an intervening party, remains absent from the newly 
created ESA framework. 
The Court could in this regard, extend its case law on judicial review of preliminary 
decisions or recommendations to the Commission adopted by regulatory agencies. Long 
standing case law states that when an agency only advises the Commission or provides 
draft Commission standards, the measure is imputable to the Commission and may only 
be subject to an action directed against that Institution.108 Similarly long standing case 
law also holds that: 
in the case of acts or decisions adopted by a procedure involving several 
stages, and particularly where they are the culmination of an internal 
procedure, it is in principle only those measures which definitively determine 
the position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure which 
are open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to 
prepare for the final decision.109  
                                                          
 
106  See for recent examples Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 
order of 6 September 2011, para 38-56; Case T-262/10, Microban International and Microban (Europe) v 
Commission, judgment of 25 October 2011, para 21-25. At present, an appeal is pending before the Court 
of Justice as well, see Case C-583/11, [2012] OJ, C58/3. 
 
107 See on the abolition of individual concern, Stephan Balthasar, ‘Locus standi rules for challenges to 
regulatory acts by private applicants: the new art. 263 (4) TFEU, (2010) 35 EL Rev. 543. 
 
108 See among others the order of 5 December 2007 in Case T-133/03 Schering-Plough v Commission and 
EMEA (not published in ECR), para 22-23:  
 
In so far as Regulation No 2309/93 provides for only advisory powers for the EMEA, the 
refusal referred to in Article 5(4) of Regulation No 542/95 must be deemed to emanate from 
the Commission itself. Since the contested measure is imputable to the Commission, it may 
be the subject of an action directed against that institution. It follows that the action must be 
dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the EMEA.  
 
See also Sogelma( n 98) para 55-56. 
 
109 See the order in T-123/03, Pfizer v Commission, [2004] ECR II-1631, para. 22. More recently, see Case 
C-39/93 P SFEI and Others v Commission [1994] ECR I-2681, para 27 to 33; Case C-147/96 Netherlands v 
Commission [2000] ECR I-4723, para 26 and 27; C-521/06 P Athinaïki Techniki v Commission [2008] ECR 
I-5829, para 42; and Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2010] ECR I-0000, para 52  
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Measures definitively determining the Institution’s position could also include 
preparatory scientific opinions formally adopted by advisory bodies – including 
regulatory agencies – that have become part of the Institution’s final decision.110 Any 
legal defects in these opinions may be relied upon in an action directed against the 
definitive act.111 The Court has thus been willing to review the legality of preparatory 
opinions to the extent that the Commission had little choice but to rely on it.112 The 
Court could adopt a similar perspective in reviewing the draft standards developed by 
the ESAs upon review of Commission Regulations or decisions incorporating them. 
These draft standards also rely on the work of experts and the Commission will be 
granted little discretion in adopting regulatory technical standards.113 
It only takes one additional step to include the ESAs as co-defendants with the 
Commission in actions for annulment against Commission decisions incorporating 
technical standards. Although actions are frequently filed against both the Commission 
and the advisory agency involved, the Courts have not firmly addressed that problem.114 
The Court could thus break new ground in allowing the ESAs to be included among the 
                                                          
110 Case T-326/99, Olivieri, [2003] ECR II-6053, para 55:  
 
However, in the present case the contested decision purely and simply confirms the revised 
opinion, to which it refers in its fourth recital. The content of that opinion, and also that of 
the assessment reports upon which it is based, are therefore an integral part of the statement 
of reasons for the contested decision, with regard in particular to the scientific assessment of 
deferiprone carried out by the CPMP and its rapporteurs. The content of the revised opinion 
must therefore be examined in the context of the application for annulment of the contested 
decision. 
 
111 Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, para 12. 
 
112 See P. Craig, 'Legal Control of Regulatory Bodies: Principle, Policy and Teleology' in P. Birkinshaw and 
M. Varney (eds.), The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon (The Hague, Kluwer, 2010), 106, referring 
to the application of that reasoning in joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 
and T-141/00, Artegodan v Commission, [2002] ECR II-4945, para 198-200. 
 
113 As apparent from ESA regulations, art 10 (1), final sentence: ‘The Commission may not change the 
content of a draft regulatory technical standard prepared by the Authority without prior coordination 
with the Authority, as set out in this Article’. 
 
114 The General Court has explicitly stated so in a recent judgment concerning an action for annulment 
addressed against both the European Commission and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The 
applicant had requested both the Commission and EMA to have to bear their own costs, because it did not 
know whether either one of them or both should act as defendant in an annulment case. The Court replied 
that:  
 
[u]nder Article 87(3) of those rules, where the circumstances are exceptional, the General 
Court may order that each party bear its own costs. In the present case, the applicant stated 
at the hearing that it also sought an order that the Commission and EMA bear their own costs 
even if the action were declared inadmissible against one of them. It justified that application 
on the basis that the question of admissibility of an action against a decision of EMA had not 
yet been resolved. Nevertheless, the Court considers that such a fact cannot constitute, in the 
present case, an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of Article 87(3) of the Rules of 
Procedure.  
 
See Case T-264/07, CSL Behring v European Commission and EMA, judgment of 9 September 2010, para 
127. The Court thus admits that the case is not resolved and did not attempt to posit or propose a solution 
in its judgment either. 
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defendants in actions for annulment of technical standards and thereby overcome 
uncertainty in case law in other domains as well. 
ESA interventions in actions lodged against the Commission implementing technical 
standards thus present the most feasible option in light of current case law evolutions. 
The absence of any mandatory involvement provisions does not present unmanageable 
problems, as the Court of Justice Statute allows the ESAs to intervene in cases regarding 
the annulment of technical standard regulations or decisions or in references for a 
preliminary ruling related to these regulations or decisions. According to Article 40 of 
the Statute, bodies, offices or agencies can intervene in procedures before the Court if 
they can establish an interest in the case at stake.115 The Rules of Procedure determine 
the formalities the application to intervene should adhere to. The President of the 
General Court or of the Court of Justice shall decide by order on the admissibility of the 
application, or can refer this decision to the Court itself.116 Even though the Rules of 
Procedure merely allow an intervener to support the form of order sought by one of the 
parties, intervention at least provides an opportunity for those affected by the decision 
to develop one’s own argument in support of one of the parties.117 
As the ESAs bear particular responsibility in drafting or editing technical standards, the 
Court should find no problem to recognise their status as interveners. This would 
encourage the ESAs to avail of that opportunity, the Court could directly and in general 
terms establish the presumed interest on behalf of the ESAs as original drafters of 
technical standards. From that perspective, the Court could be called upon to adopt an 
order in the first request for intervention, stating that ESAs are presumed always to be 
interested applicants in any intervention procedure relating to technical standards in 
which their involvement was required by the ESA regulations. Such an order - and the 
precedential value it creates118—would bring clarity and ensure that the technical 
standards gap could at least partially be overcome. 
In the alternative, the Court could support the application of ‘third party proceedings’ 
review in favour of the ESAs. Third party proceedings allow bodies, offices or agencies 
among others of the Union to contest a judgment rendered without being heard, where 
the judgment is prejudicial to their rights.119 The ESAs would have to demonstrate that a 
judgment annulling or confirming technical standards without them being heard is 
prejudicial to their rights as drafters of these standards. In most instances however, the 
                                                          
115 At least that is the commonly accepted reading of art 40 of the Statute. A comma is again lacking in the 
English language version potentially restricting the interest requirements to natural or legal persons. 
That reading is again countered by other language versions. 
 
116 Art 93 ECJ Rules of Procedure; arts 115-116 GC Rules of Procedure.  
 
117 According art 40 (4) ECJ Statute, the intervener should support the form of order sought. Following the 
Rules of Procedure, the intervener must accept the case as he finds it at the time of intervention; see 
Article 93 (4) ECJ Rules of Procedure and Article 116 (3) GC Rules of Procedure. 
 
118Although the ECJ system does not engage in formal use of precedents, the precedential value of 
particular judgments can hardly be denied, creating a system of de facto precedents, on this topic and on 
ways to improve the system see Jan Komárek, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts: The 
European Court of Justice Compared to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation’ (2008-
2009) 11 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 399 - 434. 
 
119 Art 42 of the Statute, see also arts 123-124 of the GC Rules of Procedure. 
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Court has been unwilling to allow third party proceedings for parties that could have 
relied on intervention to have their voice heard.120 Initiating or allowing third party 
proceedings would also detach the ESAs’ role of meaningful intervention from the 
dispute related to the standards it adopted. Should the Court however appear unwilling 
to allow the ESAs to intervene, third party proceedings present a constructive 
alternative. 
Intervention options in Court proceedings are more limited in preliminary ruling 
procedures: individuals cannot show an interest to intervene in the case before the ECJ, 
as the case actually originated before a national court. Third party intervention should 
therefore take place before that national judge in accordance with national procedural 
rules.121 Only Union Institutions and Member States remain able to submit statements 
related to the reference at hand.122 Article 23 of the ECJ Statute extends the submission 
of statements procedure to ‘bodies, offices and or agencies’. These should be notified of 
references for preliminary ruling relating to the validity or interpretation of acts 
adopted by them. The Statute’s reference to ‘adoption’ of acts is problematic in this 
regard. Since the ESAs did not formally adopt technical standards, they are excluded 
from submitting statements in preliminary ruling procedures. Despite the ESAs not 
being the official authors of the standards under review, they are more than just a 
supporting implementation committee. Their involvement in the preliminary ruling 
procedure could guide the Court in determining the meaning of the contested 
provisions or the scope of the reference itself. The modification or interpretation of 
Article 23 of the Statute to include the ESAs as bodies to be notified in cases regarding 
technical standards should therefore be considered. In the alternative, the Commission 
could at least be represented by an agent that consults with the ESA officers on these 
matters.123 
5.3.  Participatory Rights? 
The ESA regulations embrace wide consultation of market participants and interested 
parties before adopting technical standards and guidelines or recommendations and 
                                                          
120 See case T-284/08 TO, Avaessian Avaki and Others v People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran [2009] 
ECR II-161, para.14:  
 
The Court considered third-party proceedings to be an exceptional review procedure, 
available to interested persons who, for valid reasons, have been unable to take part in the 
original proceedings. The extraordinary, even exceptional, nature of third-party proceedings 
is justified by the consideration that, in the interests of certainty in legal relations and the 
efficient administration of justice, it is necessary to prevent, so far as is possible, persons 
having an interest in the outcome of proceedings pending before the Court of Justice or the 
Court of First Instance from asserting that interest after the Community Court has delivered 
its judgment and thus settled the question in dispute. 
 
121 Koen Lenaerts, Dirk Arts, Ignace Maselis and Robert Bray (ed.)(n 82) 611. 
 
122 Combined reading of arts 23 (1) and 40 of the Statute. 
 
123 Art 19 of the Statute allows an Institution to be represented by an agent, assisted by a lawyer or 
adviser. A jurisconsult attached to one of the ESAs could thus assist the Commission in that respect. 
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with a view to determine future policy guidelines.124 Consultation promotes 
predictability and accountability, but also legitimates ESAs’ rulemaking power 
otherwise fraught with little democratic or parliamentary support.125 The extent to 
which these consultation provisions introduce rights for market participants to have 
their opinion submitted and the judicial role in protecting these rights have remained 
unclear in the new ESA framework. As such, the enforcement of potential participatory 
rights potentially presents another gap in the remedies system the ESA regulations 
inaugurated. 
To help facilitate consultation with stakeholders in areas relevant to the ESAs’ tasks, 
each ESA is required to establish a Stakeholder Group. Stakeholder Groups are 
consulted on actions taken with regard to the adoption of regulatory and implementing 
technical standards and guidelines and recommendations that do not concern 
individual financial institutions. A Stakeholders Group comprises thirty members 
representing financial institutions operating in the Union; their employees’ 
representatives; top ranking academics as well as consumers and representatives of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Members serve for a period of two and a half 
years and may serve two successive terms. Each Stakeholders Group adopts its own 
rules of procedure by a majority of two-thirds of its members.126  
The Board of Supervisors appoints the Stakeholders Group Members following 
proposals from the relevant stakeholders. In making its decision, the Board of 
Supervisors shall, to the extent possible, ensure an appropriate geographical and gender 
balance, and representation of stakeholders across the Union. As mentioned above, this 
decision of the Board to appoint particular candidates is excluded from Board of Appeal 
review. The decision could be challenged before the Court of Justice by a candidate 
member not selected, who will be able to demonstrate direct and individual concern 
against a decision formally appointing other candidates. 
The Stakeholders Group serves as a representative body of the wider financial market 
participants’ community. In providing a consultative role, the Group – or its members 
for that matter – cannot claim to have their particular opinions included into concrete 
regulatory norms. They would merely have a right to have their opinion heard as a 
matter of procedural law. Refusal to grant that right to the Stakeholder Group in a 
particular situation could therefore infringe an ‘essential procedural requirement’ of 
consultation, resulting in annulment of the particular regulatory measure adopted.127 
                                                          
124 The Authority should consult interested parties on regulatory or implementing technical standards, 
guidelines and recommendations and provide them with a reasonable opportunity to comment on 
proposed measures, see recital 48 EBA and ESMA Regulations; Recital 47 EIOPA Regulations. 
 
125 On the virtues, vices and frameworks of consultation and participatory governance in agencies, see 
among others P. Craig, EU administrative law (OUP 2006) 179-180, 316-318, and 327-328. 
 
126 ESA Regulations, art 37. 
 
127 As acknowledged by the Courts, see amongst others case T-122/09, Zhejiang Xinshiji Foods and Hubei 
Xinshiji Foods v Council  [2011] ECR II-0000, para 104:  
 
failure to comply with a rule relating to consultation of a committee can render the final 
decision of the institution concerned unlawful only if it is sufficiently substantial and has a 
detrimental effect on the legal and factual situation of the party alleging a procedural 
irregularity. The consultation of a committee is an essential procedural requirement, breach 
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The opinions of the Group would thus remain within the purview of judicial 
accountability. Two practical issues nevertheless remain unclear. Firstly, the extent to 
which consulting the Stakeholder Group amounts to an essential procedural 
requirement and therefore grants that Group a right to be consulted has to come before 
the Court to establish clarity on that point. Second, the Stakeholders Group could not 
have standing qua Group, as it does not constitute a legal person. It merely forms a 
supporting structure of the ESA. Its individual members could potentially have standing 
as directly and individually concerned because individual participation rights granted to 
them have been violated. The latter reasoning is dependent on the Court recognising 
participation rights as judicially enforceable individual rights and not merely as Group 
rights. The Court appears to be willing to do so in cases where consultation mechanisms 
are explicitly provided by Union legislation,128 but judicial clarification is necessary to 
ascertain its applicability within the ESA framework. 
Similar problems related to the recognition of participatory rights can be distinguished 
with regard to consultation mechanisms preceding the adoption of technical standards 
and guidelines or recommendations. In the adoption process of technical standards, the 
ESAs are called upon to conduct open public consultations on draft measures and to 
analyse the potential related costs and benefits ‘unless such consultations and analyses 
are disproportionate in relation to the scope and impact of the draft regulatory 
technical standards concerned or in relation to the particular urgency of the matter’.129 
The Stakeholders Group will be consulted as well. In this situation, the ESAs entertain 
significant discretion to organise and to regulate the public consultation process and the 
invitation process for those concerned to have their opinion registered before adopting 
standards. It should therefore be no surprise that the non-organisation of consultations 
for matters of urgency or disproportionality could trigger judicial proceedings. The 
grounds for these judicial proceedings – founded on an ESA decision not to organise 
proceedings – would remain difficult to constitute an essential procedural infringement, 
as the ESA regulations allow the ESAs to withdraw from organising consultative 
proceedings. In addition, it would seem highly unlikely that any financial market 
participant would be individually concerned by a decision not to organise consultations. 
The Courts will have to determine what limits inhibit the ESAs’ discretion in this regard 
and who, if anyone, might be able to challenge these ESA decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of which affects the legality of the act adopted following consultation if it is proved that 
failure to forward certain material information did not allow the committee to deliver its 
opinion in full knowledge of the facts, that is to say, without being misled in a material 
respect by inaccuracies or omissions.  
 
This case law could by analogy be applied to the stakeholders group, it also being a consultative 
committee prior to the adoption of guidelines or draft standards. 
 
128 The Court did not recognise these rights in the absence of legislative proclamation: Case T-13/99, 
Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, [2002] ECR, II-3305, para 487; Case T-70/99, AlpharmaInc v. Council, 
[2002] ECR, II-3495, para 388; Case C-258/02 P, Bactria Industriehygiene-Service VerwaltungsGMbH v 
Commission, [2003]ECR, I-15105, para. 43; A contrario, this would seem to imply that the introduction of 
consultation obligations in a legal instrument could be sufficient to recognise their participation right 
status, see also P. Craig (n 125) 321. 
 
129 ESA Regulations, art 10 (1), para 3 and art 15 (1), para 2. 
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Participation requirements preceding the adoption of guidelines and recommendations 
allow even more discretion in consulting market participants. In this regard, the ESA 
organises open public consultations and cost/benefit analyses where relevant and 
requests an opinion from the Stakeholders group whenever it deems its input 
appropriate. Again, consultations and analyses have to be proportionate in relation to 
the scope, nature and impact of the guidelines or recommendations.130 The different 
vocabulary relied on in comparison to technical standards consultations appears to 
indicate that the ESAs retain even more discretion to organise or omit public 
consultations in relation to guidelines and recommendations. It is once more unclear 
whether and how the non-organisation of consultations could be amenable to judicial 
review, but at the very least, the ESA Regulations could be interpreted to inaugurate a 
right to be consulted in at least some instances. The Court will have to clarify whenever 
the ESAs transcend the boundaries of their discretion in this regard. Such exercise could 
additionally provide an inroad for the Courts to review the legality of guidelines and 
recommendations. The scope of discretion for organising public consultations does 
indeed depend on the ‘scope, nature and impact’ of the guidelines or recommendations. 
Any assessment of the extent to which participatory rights have been granted thus 
requires investigation of the scope, nature and impact of the guidelines and would 
enable the Court to review the legality of the guidelines’ contents as well. 
5.4.  Summary of gaps to be addressed 
This table summarises the abovementioned gaps and solutions. It is clear from the 
aforementioned analysis that legislative adaptation presents a more stable strategy to 
address gaps in the remedies’ system. Judicial clarification could nevertheless help 
overcoming these gaps and identifying their structural impact on judicial protection. 
 Judicial clarification Legislative adaptation 




ESAs as amicus curiae 
Technical standards Intervention of ESAs (and 
national supervisors); 
direct review of draft 
standards? 
ESA involvement in 
preliminary ruling 
proceedings 





6. Looking towards the future: complete judicial protection as constitutional 
necessity 
The foregoing sections highlighted particular inconsistencies and significant gaps in the 
ESAs’ remedies structure. Some of these inconsistencies or gaps require formal 
adaptation of the ESA Regulations, whereas others would benefit from clarifying judicial 
interpretations to render judicial review more complete. This section argues in favour 
of adopting this interpretative and adaptive approach as a matter of ‘constitutional’ 
                                                          
130 ESA Regulations, art 16 (2). 
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necessity that transcends the scope of financial regulation. The system created by the 
EU Treaties and interpreted by the European Court of Justice fundamentally requires a 
complete and coherent system of judicial protection, the attainment of which remains 
dependent on Boards of Appeal’s and the Court’s willingness to engage in that project. 
It could be argued that the complete judicial protection project is constitutionally 
mandated. Article 19(1) TFEU states that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties, the ECJ has to ensure that the law is observed.131 The latter Article is relied on 
as a basis for the ECJ to establish a system that emphasises judicial review and effective 
judicial protection as intrinsic components of an EU rule of law.132 The observance of 
the law requirement allows for the progressive establishment of a complete and 
coherent system of judicial protection vis-à-vis actions of Union Institutions.133 In 
particular, a combination of legal remedies and procedures before both the Union 
courts and national courts has to ensure that the legality of acts of Union Institutions is 
reviewable in all instances (completeness). Completeness thus implies that it must be 
possible to bring an action before the national courts if and to the extent that direct 
actions before European Courts are inadmissible.134 This purportedly complete system 
requires a balanced division of jurisdictional competences among EU and national 
courts, aligned with the allocation of jurisdiction in the Treaty system (coherence). 
Coherence therefore implies the existence of direct and indirect routes of legality 
review for acts of the institutions, with differentially nuanced roles for national and EU 
judges.135 
The ideals of complete and coherent judicial protection have been developed with 
regard to acts of the Union Institutions.136 The system of judicial protection does not 
                                                          
131 The Court’s Les Verts case (n 99) remains seminal in that regard. The EU is:  
 
a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its member states nor its 
institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in 
conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. Moreover, [n]atural and legal 
persons are thus protected against the application to them of general measures which they 
cannot contest directly before the court by reason of the special conditions of admissibility 
laid down in the second paragraph of article 173 of the Treaty. Where the Community 
institutions are responsible for the administrative implementation of such measures, natural 
or legal persons may bring a direct action before the Court against implementing measures 
which are addressed to them or which are of direct and individual concern to them and, in 
support of such an action, plead the illegality of the general measures on which they are 
based. Where implementation is a matter for the national authorities, such persons may 
plead the invalidity of general measures before the national courts and cause the latter to 
request the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
 
132 See Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’, 
(2007) 44 CML Rev., 1625, 1625. For a similar perspective in from a national legal order standpoint, see 




134 Ibid., 1626. 
 
135 Ibid., 1632. See also Koen Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European 
Court of Justice’, (2009-2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338-1387. 
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however only apply to acts of these Institutions, but also to acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.137 Even 
though these acts ‘may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning 
actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or 
agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to them’,138 the basic principle of 
judicial review against agencies’ acts remains in place. Within the realm of EU 
regulatory agencies, the role of national courts remains rather limited, as the 
abovementioned analysis demonstrates. Only with regard to guidelines and 
recommendations could a role for national courts be envisaged. That role should 
nevertheless be significantly limited, as guidelines and recommendations directly 
emanate from the supranational level and would therefore require supranational 
judicial control. Complete protection at EU level therefore remains predominantly to be 
realised by EU courts by virtue of their constitutional mandate. 
In addition to the Courts, newly established Boards of Appeal comprising legal experts 
provide an additional argument in favour of developing a complete judicial review 
regime in supervisory decision-making. Board Members function as de facto 
administrative judges; they are knowledgeable about procedures and judicial protection 
as well as about substantive sector-specific regulation. A Board of Appeal familiar with 
and committed to enhancing the remedies’ system in light of constitutional 
completeness and coherence requirements might indeed more readily recognise and 
address particular gaps and inconsistencies. Again, the commitment to law maintained 
by Board of Appeal members indicates that the Board is to operate within a 
constitutionally mandated system of judicial protection. Both Board and Courts will 
thus have to develop a workable set of interpretative statements that allow for the 
system of judicial protection against supervisory decisions to be rendered complete. 
7. Conclusion 
The introduction of a remedies and appeals’ system in itself presents a major leap 
forward for the operations of European financial market supervision structures. 
Contrary to the situation in the level three network committees, the ESA remedies 
system allows the Court of Justice to confirm and extend its constitutional principles to 
highly specialised market supervisory regimes previously detached from direct judicial 
oversight. Particular gaps and inconsistencies in the remedies framework however 
remain to be addressed. Now that legislators have acted to create a more perfect system 
of market supervision based on the rule of law, the Court of Justice is invited to engage 
upon its constitutional role of providing complete and coherent judicial protection by 
filling gaps and addressing inconsistencies. In so doing, the Court will determine the 
extent to which the EU constitutional framework enables and restrains the operations 
of financial market supervision activities under a judicially sanctioned EU Rule of Law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
136 The Union Institutions are, according to art 13 TEU, the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central 
Bank and the Court of Auditors. 
 
137 See for an evolutionary perspective in that regard, Anna Simonati, ‘The principles of administrative 
procedure and the EU courts: an evolution in progress?’, (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law, 
45-81. 
 
138 Art 263 (4) TFEU. See also the discussions on the stringency of standing and the scope of review in 4.1 
and 4.3. 
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Reliance on less stringent standing and ‘Member State’ identification requirements, 
extensive application of intervention provisions, incorporation of review against 
guidelines as essential procedural requirements amenable to review and recognition of 
participatory rights constitute constitutionally available elements for judges to refine 
and improve the current protection system. 
The case of financial supervisory authorities sets an example for future market 
supervisory structures. Solutions proposed here could indeed be applied to different 
sectors welcoming judicial review against supervisory agencies’ decisions and 
providing for additional regulation or standard-setting roles in particular market 
sectors. Recent initiatives in energy139 and electronic communications market 
supervision140 have transformed formerly informal network committees into more 
integrated EU agencies.141 These initiatives prelude potentially more intensive agency 
decision-making procedures and the ensuing need to rely on Treaty provisions and case 
law establishing judicial protection by individuals adversely affected by agency 
decisions. Court interventions in the ESA remedies system – in response to 
inconsistencies and gaps identified – might therefore prelude and support the creation 
of a full-fledged judicially accountable market supervision regime at EU level. 
 
                                                          
139 In energy law, Regulation 713/2009 created an Agency (ACER) with binding individual decision 
making powers, see Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 
2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, [2009] O.J. L 211/1. 
 
140 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 November 2009 
establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 
[2009] O.J. L 337/1. BEREC actually remains rather informal. Only the office has been granted legal 
personality. That does not imply that future adjustments might render BEREC more integrated into the 
framework of decision-making regulatory agencies. 
 
141 Saskia Lavrijssen and Leigh Hancher (n 2) 23-55. 
